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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in environmental law in Virginia con-
tinue to reflect several trends. These trends may be grouped into
six general categories: (1) the growing tension between federal
environmental mandates and their practical implementation
through delegated state programs; (2) the continuing debate over
the exact definition of "interstate commerce" and the scope of
state authority to regulate in the gray area; (3) the impending de-
regulation of the electrical energy market; (4) the promotion of
sustainable development; (5) the developing schism between state
and local land use control; and (6) the evolving nature of adminis-
trative law in the environmental context. The following survey
discusses changes to the body of environmental law affecting Vir-
ginians during 2000-2001 in the context of each of these trends.
II. FEDERAL MANDATES AND DELEGATED STATE PROGRAMS
A number of developments in environmental law during the
past year intensified the tension between federal mandates and
delegated state programs. At the core of this tension is the impo-
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sition by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") of increasingly more stringent standards on media qual-
ity and technology through revised regulatory programs (e.g., the
Total Maximum Daily Load program), control over and allocation
of resources (e.g., NO. SIP Call), and administrative and judicial
enforcement (e.g., new source review enforcement initiatives). In
response, the Commonwealth of Virginia is left with the daunting
task of implementing these mandates in a way that achieves
EPA's goals without stifling the economy, shipping employment
out of state or overseas, exhausting state resources, or harming
the environment. Ironically, as EPA's command and control of
environmental regulation expands, competing state environ-
mental objectives, such as sustainability, become more difficult to
achieve. We discuss some of these developments by environ-
mental media.
A. Air
In 2000 and 2001, EPA continued to concentrate significant ef-
forts on reducing air emissions, particularly nitrogen oxide
("NO") emissions, through several overlapping programs. EPA
promulgated a new eight-hour ozone standard that was the sub-
ject of significant litigation in the recently decided American
Trucking case.' It issued a NOx state implementation plan ("SIP")
Call requiring reductions of NOx emissions from twenty-two
states,2 along with an overlapping petition from the northeastern
states, to reduce NO. emissions under section 126 of the Clear Air
Act.3 Finally, EPA initiated enforcement actions against members
of the utility, paper, and oil refining industries in an attempt to
require new technologies to reduce NOx emissions.4 Unfortu-
nately, there are significant inconsistencies and redundancies
among these various programs, which make them very difficult to
implement at the state level.
1. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
2. See Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,356 (Oct. 27,
1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51).
3. See Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions
for Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 65 Fed. Reg. 2674, 2674 (Jan. 18,
2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52, 92).
4. See, e.g., In re Tennessee Valley Authority, No. CAA-2000-04-008, 2000 EPA App.
LEXIS 25 (EPA Envtl. App. Bd. Sept. 15, 2000).
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1. The Eight-Hour Ozone Standard and American Trucking
EPA revised the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS") for particulate matter ("PM") and ozone on July 18,
1997. The new ozone standards are averaged over eight hours, as
compared to the old, less stringent, one-hour standards.6 Several
industries and states (including Virginia) challenged the stan-
dards in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit.7 Virginia's interest lay in the fact that more of
Northern Virginia, Tidewater, and the Richmond and Roanoke
metropolitan regions will be classified as not attaining the ozone
NAAQS. This, in turn, discourages economic development by pro-
hibiting the production of additional volatile organic compounds,
or NO. emissions, in those areas.
The Court of Appeals remanded, holding that EPA had inter-
preted the statute in such a way as to have no standards to guide
it, violating the "nondelegation" doctrine! The United States Su-
preme Court overruled the D.C. Circuit on the nondelegation is-
sue, finding that section 109 of the Clean Air Act-which provides
that EPA must establish standards "requisite" to protect the pub-
lic health allowing for an adequate margin of safety-means that
EPA must set NAAQS that are neither "lower [n] or higher than is
necessary."9 Therefore, section 109 did not violate the "nondelega-
tion doctrine." ° Justice Breyer elaborated in his concurrence that,
under this standard, EPA may not refuse to consider "whether a
proposed rule promotes safety overall."" However, the Court
5. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,652, 38,653 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,856 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
6. 40 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2001).
7. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
8. Id. at 1034. The nondelegation doctrine prohibits agencies from fashioning rules
without adequate justification, lest the rule be considered an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power. See id. at 1033. The D.C. Circuit determined that EPA acted more like
a legislative body when it promulgated the eight-hour standard for the ground-level ozone
and the fine standards. Id. at 1034. The court also determined that EPA's promulgation of
the coarse PM standard was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1033-34. The questionable
standards were remanded to EPA so that it might develop intelligible principles upon
which to base the specific numeric concentrations in its NAAQS for ozone and PM. Id. at
1057.
9. Whitman v. Am. TruckingAss'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 914 (2001).
10. Id.
1L Id. at 924 (Breyer, J., concurring).
20011
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found that EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act relating to
implementation of the ozone standard was unreasonable. 2 The
Court remanded to the D.C. Circuit for consideration of whether
EPA's rulemakings were consistent with this standard and for
consideration of other challenges to the NAAQS that were not
raised for the Court's review. 3 The Court also affirmed the D.C.
Circuit's decision that EPA could not consider "implementation
costs" when setting NAAQS.' 4
The Court rejected EPA's argument that questions concerning
how it would implement its ozone NAAQS were not "ripe for re-
view," 5 and rejected as unlawful EPA's attempt to implement its
revised ozone NAAQS.' 6 The Court directed EPA to develop an
ozone NAAQS implementation strategy based upon a "reasonable
interpretation" of the so-called "Subpart 2" provision of the Act.'7
The Supreme Court decision did not end American Trucking.
Because of its decision on the nondelegation issue, the Court of
Appeals left unresolved some issues about the ambient standards.
Currently, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to resolve
those issues.
8
2. NOx SIP Call
On February 12, 2001, Virginia's State Air Pollution Control
Board ("SAPCB") proposed revisions to several air regulations
that would require owners of large stationary NO. sources to limit
air emissions to a specified level in order to protect public health
and welfare. 9 The proposed regulations would make the state
version of the NO. Reasonably Achievable Control Technology
("RACT") rule consistent with the federally approved version and
would adopt NO. controls as may be necessary to address air
quality violations. 2' The SAPCB perceived the proposed regula-
12. Id. at 919.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 915-16.
16. Id. at 919.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 1641 (Feb. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE).
20. Id.
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tions as an advantage to the general public because air quality
will improve with less cost and intrusiveness compared to the
NO. SIP Call.21 Cost was considered a key issue because the util-
ity industry would be affected by the proposed regulations and
would, in turn, pass the costs on to the consumer in the form of
rate hikes.2 2 Substantively, the proposed revisions would: (1) de-
lete the provision that pertains to the seasonal applicability for
the NO. RACT requirements; (2) delete the provisions that pro-
vide an exemption for any steam generating unit, process heater,
or gas turbine with a rated capacity of less than 100,000,000 Btu
per hour and any combustion unit with a rated capacity of less
than 50,000,000 Btu per hour; (3) delete the provisions that pro-
vide for an emission allocation system to meet the RACT re-
quirement; (4) add provisions that establish emission standards
for nitrogen oxides from electric generating units and nonelectric
generating units; (5) add provisions for a NO. emissions compli-
ance demonstration that allow emissions rate averaging; (6) add
provisions for a plan, approved by the SAPCB, that allow the use
of banked emissions credits in the NO. emissions compliance
demonstration; and (7) add provisions for early reduction credits
to be used in the NO emissions compliance plan.23
3. Vehicle Emissions (Northern Virginia)
On September 25, 2000, the SAPCB repealed regulations for
the Control of Motor Vehicle Emissions and for Vehicle Emissions
Control Program Analyzer Systems.24 These regulations were re-
pealed because the enhanced motor vehicle emissions inspection
program for the Northern Virginia ozone nonattainment area is
fully operational. On November 20, 2000, the SAPCB announced
that it intended to consider amending the regulations for the
Control of Motor Vehicle Emissions in Northern Virginia to con-
form to state law and federal Clean Air Act requirements for the
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 9 VA. ADmIN. CODE §§ 5-90-10 to -90-310, 5-100-10 to -100-500 (1989) (repealed
2000).
25. Id.
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testing of emissions from motor vehicles located or primarily op-
erated in Northern Virginia.26
The SAPCB announced also its intent to adopt regulations that
establish controls for visible emissions from motor vehicles and to
repeal the existing regulations." The SAPCB concluded that the
current regulations are not consistent with applicable state and
federal requirements, statutory provisions, and judicial deci-
sions." Most motor vehicles in Northern Virginia are now subject
to inspection and maintenance programs that provide for a more
stringent level of control of visible emissions and pollutants than
those provided for by the current regulations.29 The replacement
regulations contain provisions addressing anti-tampering, visible
emission standards, commercial and public service motor vehi-
cles, and the import/export of motor vehicles.3"
B. Water
Developments in the law governing water quality over the past
year have followed two disparate tracks. The first track reflects a
shift in regulatory priorities, from the traditional focus on control-
ling pollutant discharges from point sources through the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permitting
program, to a new focus on restoring and protecting the ambient
quality of receiving waters through a revised and still evolving
Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") program. The second track
reflects a more mundane updating of state regulations to keep
pace with changes in corresponding federal regulations.
1. TMDL Program
a. Background
For decades, point source dischargers, such as publicly owned
treatment works and industrial facilities, have been subject to ef-
26. See Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 676 (Nov. 20, 2000).
27. See Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 1252 (Jan. 15, 2001).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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fluent limitations imposed through the NPDES permitting pro-
gram.3 1 However, from the inception of the Clean Water Act, Con-
gress recognized that even with these effluent limitations in
place, some waters may not attain or maintain applicable water
quality standards. Under section 1313(d), Congress directed
states to identify these "impaired" waters and to establish a "total
maximum daily load" or TMDL for each impaired water segment
"at a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality
standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety which
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relation-
ship between effluent limitations and water quality."32
The TMDL concept was written into the original Clean Water
Act in 1972. States were required to submit their lists of impaired
waters, along with TMDLs for such waters, to EPA by June 26,
1979, and thereafter, "from time to time."3 However, in the
twenty years that elapsed since the initial submission deadline,
few TMDLs were actually established for impaired waters. In
fact, during this time period in Virginia, no TMDLs were estab-
lished and submitted to EPA for review. 4 As a result of what they
perceived to be inordinate delay, environmental groups began su-
ing EPA seeking to compel implementation of the TMDL pro-
gram.3 To date, there have been approximately forty lawsuits in
thirty-eight jurisdictions. 6 In at least eighteen of these jurisdic-
tions, including Virginia, the lawsuits have resulted in enforce-
able schedules for TMDL development.37 Pursuant to a 1999 con-
sent decree with EPA, Virginia must complete over 600 TMDLs
by May 1, 2010.38 To date, Virginia has finalized twenty TMDLs. 39
31. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
32. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (C).
33. Id. § 1313(d)(2); see Am. Canoe Ass'n v. EPA, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (E.D. Va.
1998).
34. Am. Canoe, 30 F. Supp. at 913. This accounting was slightly revised in Am. Canoe
Ass'n v. EPA, 54 F. Supp. 2d 621 (E.D. Va. 1999). "In the nearly twenty years that have
elapsed since the initial 1979 deadline, Virginia either has submitted no TMDLs or has
submitted a single TMDL for one small tributary in the state, and EPA has never estab-
lished any TMDL for any of Virginia's waters." Id. at 624.
35. See TMDL Lawsuit Information, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/
lawsuitl.html (last modified July 19, 2001).
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See Am. Canoe Ass'n v. EPA, 138 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730 (E.D. Va. 2001).
39. See TMDL Development Information, available at httpJ/www.deq.state.va.us/
tmdl/tmdlrpts.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
2001]
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Although the requirements of section 303(d) appeared straight-
forward after the first wave of lawsuits placed the program "back
on track," implementation remains the subject of significant con-
troversy. This controversy came to a head with EPA's promulga-
tion of the "New TMDL Rule" in the summer of 2000.40
b. Federal TMDL Regulatory Program
EPA promulgated regulations designed to implement section
303(d) of the Clean Water Act in 1985 and revised them in 1992.41
On July 13, 2000, EPA issued comprehensive revisions to these
regulations. Assuming these revisions take effect as drafted,
they will significantly alter the scope of the section 303(d) regula-
tory program. 3 Although a comprehensive analysis of the differ-
40. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Re-
visions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586
(July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-24, 130) [hereinafter New TMDL
Rule].
41. See Surface Water Toxics Control Program and Water Quality Planning and Man-
agement Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,049 (July 24, 1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 130.7).
42. See New TMDL Rule, supra note 40.
43. See id. This assumption originally hinged on action taken by Congress shortly be-
fore EPA issued the New TMDL Rule. As a rider to an appropriations bill, Congress
barred EPA from spending any 2000 or 2001 fiscal year funds on the implementation of
the New TMDL Rule. Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction Appropriations Bill, Pub. L.
No. 106-246, 114 Stat. 567 (2000). Because of this Congressional action, the New TMIDL
Rule will not take effect, at the earliest, until thirty days after the date on which Congress
allows EPA to implement the regulation. New TMDL Rule, supra note 40, at 43,660. The
effective date of the New TMDL Rule, as well as the scope of that rule, have become fur-
ther obscured by regulatory action recently initiated by EPA. On August 9, 2001, EPA
published a proposal to delay by eighteen months the effective date of the New TMDL
Rule and to revise the date on which states are required to submit their next list of im-
paired waters from April 1, 2002, to October 1, 2002 (except Georgia, where EPA is re-
quired by court order to take action on the state's 2002 list by October 1, 2001). 66 Fed.
Reg. 41,817, 41,817-18 (Aug. 9, 2001). In this proposal, EPA acknowledged the contro-
versy generated by the New TMDL Rule and indicated that the proposed delay would en-
able EPA to reconsider some of the choices made in that rule. Id. at 41,818. In particular,
EPA noted that voluntary reconsideration of the rule may result in revisions that would
resolve at least some of the issues raised in pending litigation over the New TMDL Rule.
Id. (That litigation includes at least ten petitions filed by states, industrial and agricul-
tural groups, and environmental organizations, pending before the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a consolidated proceeding styled, Am. Farm
Bureau Fed'n v. Whitman, No. 00-1320 (D.C. Cir. filed by July 18, 2000)). Given the con-
tinued criticisms of the New TMDL Rule, on July 16, 2001, EPA also asked the court of
appeals to stay all lawsuits concerning the new rule for eighteen months to allow EPA to
review and revise the rule. See Press Release, EPA, Whitman Pledges to Improve Im-
paired Waters Rule (July 16, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdlldefer.
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ences between the existing and new regulations would likely yield
a number of issues (both small and large), this article identifies
five critical differences with potentially far-reaching impacts.
First, the New TMDL Rule radically expands the definition of
TMDL. Under existing regulations, a TMDL is defined as the sum
of the greatest amount of loadings from point sources (designated
as the wasteload allocation or "WLA"), nonpoint sources, and
natural background (these latter two, collectively designated as
the load allocation or "L'A") that a waterbody can receive without
violating water quality standards.' Conversely, under the New
TMDL Rule, the term is defined to encompass not only this
maximum allowable loading or cap, but also specific load alloca-
tions for each point source and nonpoint source, an allowance for
reasonable growth and an implementation plan. 5
The implementation plan must provide a description of actions
necessary to implement the TMDL so that the waterbody attains
and maintains water quality standards.4 The adequacy of the
implementation plan will be assessed by EPA under its concept of
"reasonable assurance," which essentially ensures that the plan
will indeed be implemented.4
Second, the New TMDL Rule alters several critical milestones
in the TMDL development process. As discussed above, states
must first identify impaired waters and then establish TMDLs.
Under the existing regulations, states must submit to EPA both
their lists of impaired waters and their methodologies for these
listing decisions." Under the new rule, states will be required to
44. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(f)-(i) (2000). This definition is supplemented in 40 C.F.R. §
130.7(c)(1) (2000), which provides that a TMDL must also reflect seasonal variations and a
margin of safety that takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship
between effluent limitations and water quality. Id.
45. New TMDL Rule, supra note 40, at 43,662.
46. Id. at 43,668.
47. Id. at 43,598. In this portion of the preamble, EPA proceeds to discuss its belief
"that it has the authority to require the demonstration of reasonable assurance as part of
the implementation plan." Id. Further,
[t]o approve a TMDL, EPA believes it is necessary to determine whether a
TMDL is in fact established at a level necessary to attain water quality stan-
dards. For EPA to determine that the TMDL will implement water quality
standards, there must be a demonstration in the TMDL of reasonable assur-
ance that the T1IvDL's load and wasteload allocations will be implemented.
Id. The definition of "reasonable assurance" will be set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(p). Id. at
43,597.
48. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(6) (2000).
2001]
610 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:601
submit these methodologies to EPA at least two years before they
submit their actual lists.49 Moreover, the timing for the submis-
sion of these lists has been changed from every two years under
the existing regulations, to every four years under the new rule.50
Perhaps most significantly, the New TMDL Rule affects the mile-
stones for TMDL implementation. Under the existing regulations,
states are required to develop a priority ranking for all listed wa-
ters requiring TMDLs and to identify waters "targeted for TMDL
development in the next two years."51 Under the new rules, states
must develop a prioritized schedule for establishing TMDLs no
later than ten years from the date the waterbody is listed.52
Third, the New TMDL Rule changes the scope of the listing
process by expanding the bases on which states must identify im-
paired waters. Under the existing regulations, states are required
to identify waters for which effluent limitations and other pollu-
tion control requirements are not stringent enough to implement
applicable water quality standards.53 Under the new rule, the
scope of the impaired waters list is expanded considerably to in-
clude: (1) waterbodies impaired by pollutants or pollution from
any source (including point sources, nonpoint sources, storm wa-
ter sources that are not subject to NPDES permitting, ground wa-
ter, and atmospheric deposition); (2) waterbodies for which bio-
logical information indicates impairment; (3) waterbodies that
are impaired solely by nonpoint sources; and (4) waterbodies that
are not maintaining designated or more protective existing uses
that were attained on or after November 25, 1975.54
Fourth, the New TMDL Rule adds an enforcement backdrop
that is not included in the existing regulations. Under this back-
drop, EPA must establish a TMDL if a state has not made sub-
stantial progress in establishing the TMDL in accordance with its
49. New TMDL Rule, supra note 40, at 43,665.
50. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d) (2000), with New TMDL Rule, supra note 40, at
43,667.
51. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(4) (2000).
52. New TMDL Rule, supra note 40, at 43,666. States may extend this schedule by no
more than five years if they explain to the EPA that, despite expeditious actions, estab-
lishment of all TMDLs is not practicable. Id.
53. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(1)-(3) (2000). "Applicable water quality standards" is defined
to refer to any water quality standards established under section 303 of the Clean Water
Act, including numeric criteria, narrative criteria, waterbody uses, and antidegradation
requirements. Id. § 130.7(3).
54. New TMDL Rule, supra note 40, at 43,665.
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approved schedule." "Substantial progress" is defined to mean
that the state has established a TMDL not later than the end of
the one-year period during which it was scheduled to be estab-
lished.5" EPA must establish the TMDL within two years of the
date on which a state fails to make substantial progress.57
Finally, the New TMDL Rule alters the procedure by which
states may modify their impaired waters lists. The existing regu-
lations do not expressly provide for such modifications between
listing cycles, which means that states must wait for the next list-
ing deadline in order to make changes to their existing lists (e.g.,
to delist waterbodies that are no longer identified as impaired).
Under the new rule, 40 C.F.R. § 130.29, modifications may occur
at any time. Under this section, however, a listed waterbody may
only be removed from the list if new data or information indicates
that the waterbody is attaining and maintaining applicable water
quality standards.5
Although the New TMDL Rule is scheduled to take effect on
October 31, 2001, a proposal recently issued by EPA would delay
the effective date until April 30, 2003." As part of this eighteen-
month delay, EPA has indicated that it will reconsider and possi-
bly change the New TMDL Rule.6 ° The scope and effect of the
New TMDL Rule is also subject to a lawsuit initiated by numer-
ous point source and nonpoint source petitioners in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.6 The
D.C. Circuit is currently considering motions filed by the peti-
tioners regarding the disposition of the lawsuit pending EPA's re-
consideration of the New TMDL Rule. The court may decide to
stay the lawsuit entirely, as EPA and several of the petitioners
have requested, or to sever and allow litigation to proceed on cer-
tain issues, as other petitioners have requested. As of the writing
of this article, critical issues associated with the New TMDL
Rule, including when and if it will take effect, remain in flux. De-
spite this uncertainty over the future scope and effect of the fed-
eral TMDL program, one aspect remains certain from the first
55. Id. at 43,669.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 43,666-67.
59. 66 Fed. Reg. 41817, 41822 (Aug. 9, 2001).
60. Id. at 41819-20.
61. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Whitman, No. 00-1320 (D.C. Cir. filed July 18, 2000).
2001]
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wave of lawsuits-states will be required to devote substantial
resources to the development of TMDLs for impaired waterbodies
over the next decade and beyond, a daunting task that is com-
pounded by the current uncertainty over the "rules of the game."62
c. Virginia Implementation and Response
(1) Procedural Regulations
The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ")
recently initiated a rulemaking to enhance the Virginia TMDL
program.63 The rulemaking is expected to address the public par-
ticipation process for TMDL development, procedures for submit-
tal of proposed TMDLs to EPA for approval, subsequent adoption
of TMDLs by the State Water Control Board ("SWCB"), and in-
clusion of TMDLs (including implementation plans) in water
quality management plans.64 The rulemaking is expected to re-
peal all existing water quality management plans, many of which
are obsolete, but nonetheless are still included in the Virginia
Administrative Code.66
(2) Water Quality Standards Amendments
Of the several hundred waters slated for TMDL development in
Virginia, at least forty-six were identified as impaired due to
natural conditions.66 To better address this type of natural im-
pairment, the SWCB revised the state's water quality standards
regulation.67 Under the revision, naturally low dissolved oxygen
62. Unless and until the New TMDL Rule takes effect, the existing 1992 regulatory
program will remain in place to govern the TMDL process. However, state regulators,
regulated entities, environmental groups, and interested citizens will need to pay close
attention to the pending regulatory and litigation developments to ensure that resources
are not unnecessarily or errantly allocated to obsolete TMDL program requirements.
63. Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 496-97 (Nov. 6, 2000) (to
be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-720-10).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY
LOAD PROGRAM: A TEN YEAR IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 2-5 (Nov. 1, 2000) [hereinafter TMDL
Report].
67. See Final Regulations, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2380 (Apr. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 9
VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-26-55).
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concentrations, as determined by the SWCB, do not constitute a
violation of water quality standards." The revision will not be-
come effective until thirty days after notice of EPA approval is
published in the Virginia Register.69 DEQ will likely request EPA
to approve the removal of the forty-six waters listed as a result of
natural conditions during the next listing cycle.7'
In addition, seven of the waters slated for TMDL development,
including the Chesapeake Bay and its tidal tributaries, were
identified as impaired due to excessive nutrient levels.7 These
waters are subject to the 2000 Chesapeake Bay Agreement, and
as a result, EPA has agreed to a ten-year moratorium on the de-
velopment of a nutrient TMDL for these waters.72 The morato-
rium is designed to give the partners to the 2000 agreement an
opportunity to continue their cooperative nutrient reduction ef-
forts.7 3 Under the 2000 agreement, the goal is for these waters to
meet applicable water quality standards, and in turn, be eligible
for delisting by 2010.74 If this goal is not achieved, a TMDL must
be issued by May 2011.7"
Regulators are contemplating other changes to the state's wa-
ter quality standards. A draft proposal for changes to bacteria,
recreational use, and ammonia standards was presented to the
SWCB on June 12, 2001. In addition, a Notice of Intended Regu-
latory Action was published on January 29, 2001, reflecting the
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See TMDL Report, supra note 66, at 2-5. As discussed, the deadline for the next
submission of lists to EPA is currently set for April 1, 2002, but may be delayed until Oc-
tober 1, 2002, under a proposal recently issued by EPA. See discussion supra note 43.
7L See TMDL Report, supra note 66, at 2-6.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Actions to improve water quality in the Bay and its tributaries are guided by
the Chesapeake Bay Tributary Strategies, developed in accordance with Chapter 5.1 of
Title 2.1, Article 2 of the Virginia Code. Id. at 2-10. Pursuant to the 2000 agreement, the
state's existing tributary strategies must be revised in 2002 to identify the nutrient reduc-
tion actions necessary to meet water quality standards by the 2010 deadline. Id. The Bay
and its tributaries are not the only waters with excessive nutrients. On May 8, 2001, the
SWCB amended 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 25-26-350, -400 to designate Stony Creek and its
tributaries in Shenandoah County as a nutrient enriched waterbody. Final Regulations,
16 Va. Regs. Reg. 2178 (May 8, 2000). After the effective date of this new designation, cer-
tain municipal and industrial dischargers will be required to restrict their phosphorus dis-
charges pursuant to the SWCB's companion regulation set forth in 9 VA. ADmIN. CODE §§
25-40-10 to -60. See id.
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SWCB's intent to pursue multiple proposed amendments to the
standards that were identified by EPA in connection with the
761997 triennial review.
2. VPDES Permit Program
On August 28, 2000, the SWCB amended the VPDES permit
regulation so it would conform with changes in the federal
NPDES program and the state water control law.77 These
amendments reflect: (1) new application requirements for Pub-
licly Owned Treatment Works ("POTW") and other treatment
works treating domestic sewage; (2) revisions to the standards for
use and disposal of sewage sludge; (3) revised storm water dis-
charge regulations; and (4) permitting requirements for dis-
charges of treated sewage into impoundments and releases of wa-
ters from impoundments that are regulated by VPDES permits."
On February 6, 2001, the SWCB again amended the VPDES
permit regulation to reflect changes in the federal NPDES pro-
gram, including the repeal of the federal effluent guideline regu-
lation for the Builders Paper and Board Mills industrial cate-
gory.79 The SWCB also finalized several clerical amendments
designed to eliminate redundant or unnecessary regulatory lan-
guage, clarifying procedures, and correct typographical errors.8 "
C. Waste
After almost twenty years of separate federal and state haz-
ardous waste regulations, which led to delays in implementing
federal mandates at the state level, on September 19, 2000, the
Virginia Waste Management Board ('VWMB") promulgated haz-
ardous waste management regulations that incorporate, by refer-
ence, text from Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations into
76. Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 1442, 1442 (Jan. 29, 2001)
(to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-260-5).
77. Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination Permit Regulation, 16 Va. Regs. Reg.
3252, 3252 (Aug. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-31-10).
78. Id.
79. Final Regulations, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2076 (Mar. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 9 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 20-170-10).
80. Id.
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the Virginia regulations.8 ' This was part of a move, first taken in
February 1999, to adopt various portions of Title 40 by reference
8 2
in an attempt to ensure consistency with the federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act program.
8 3
D. State Regulation Beyond Federal Mandate
The General Assembly's concern about confusion in the federal
wetlands program and the proliferation of so-called Tulloch ditch-
ing' has resulted in a new state nontidal wetlands program.
Similarly, federal agencies continue to search for a solution for
the impact suffered as a result of Tulloch ditching.
1. Virginia Regulation of Wetlands
In accordance with changes to Virginia Code section 62.1-
44.15.5, the SWCB was required to promulgate regulations effect-
ing the Virginia Water Protection Permit Program.85 Through
this program, general permits are developed to streamline the
permit process and to protect Virginia's wetlands resource.
As proposed, the Virginia Water Protection Permit Program es-
tablishes four types of general permits including: (1) those for ac-
tivities causing wetland impacts of less than one-half an acre;
8 6
(2) those for facilities and activities of utilities and public service
companies; (3) those for Virginia Department of Transportation
81. See Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 132, 132 (Oct. 9, 2000)
(to be codified at 9 VA. ADmIN. CODE § 20-60-10).
82. Final Regulations, Va. Regs. Reg. 1158 (Jan. 18, 1999) (to be codified at 9 VA.
ADuN. CODE).
83. See 40 C.F.R. § 271.4 (2000).
84. In its proposed wetlands regulations, the SWCB defined Tulloch ditching as a
method used to "actively drain wetlands without adding fill to the wetlands." Proposed
Regulations, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 1921, 1922 n.1 (Feb. 26, 2001) (to be codified at 9 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 25-210-10).
85. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:5(D) (Cum. Supp. 2000) ("The Board shall develop
general permits for such activities in wetlands as it deems appropriate."). The Virginia
Water Protection permit provisions of the code were enacted by the 2000 General Assem-
bly (S.B. 648 and H.B. 1170). These regulations were finalized on July 16, 2001, with an
effective date of October 1, 2001. See Final Regulations, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 3315 (July 16,
2001) (to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-660-10).
86. Proposed Regulations, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 1946 (Feb. 26, 2001) (to be codified at 9
VA. ADtN. CODE § 25-660-10).
87. Id. at 1955.
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('VDOT") or other linear transportation projects;8 and (4) those
for impacts caused by development activities.8 9
The regulations will reduce the impact to isolated wetlands
that may otherwise be permissible in light of delays in promulgat-
ing a federal successor to the Tulloch Rule9" and the limitations
placed on federal agency jurisdiction over wetlands by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in SWANCC.1 In addition, the
regulations require increased reporting of impacts to wetlands in
order to track the SWCB's goal of no net loss of wetland acreage
or function.92
As the proposed regulations are currently structured, the per-
mitting process for individuals who want to alter the physical and
functional properties of wetlands will be as follows: (1) DEQ will
make sure that no net loss of wetland acreage and function due to
the physical or functional alteration proposed by the permit ap-
plicant, and within this determination, DEQ will decide whether
wetland mitigation is required;93 (2) an applicant must submit a
complete application, including a delineation of the wetland,
maps, and drawings of the property, information about the prop-
erty owner, the purchase of the project, a timeline for the project,
information on how it impacts the wetlands, a description of how
impacts have been avoided and/or minimized to the maximum ex-
tent practicable, and a summary of all compensatory mitigation
being proposed;94 and, (3) the applicant must pay an application
fee of between $200 and $3,000, depending on the size of the wet-
land project. 5
The proposed regulations prohibit: dredging, filling, or dis-
88. Id. at 1968.
89. Id. at 1982.
90. The problems the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") and EPA have
had in promulgating a new rule defining the term "discharge of dredged material" are dis-
cussed in Part II.D.2. of this article.
91. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001); see also discussion infra Part III.A. While the General Assembly required
the SWCB to promulgate regulations before the Supreme Court decided SWANCC, some of
the regulations have been effective in filling the void created by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion that impacts what waters remain within the jurisdiction of the federal government.
92. Virginia Water Protection Permit Program Regulation, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 1921,
1921-25 (Feb. 26, 2001) (to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE).
93. Id. at 1922.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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charge of a pollutant into or adjacent to a surface water; excava-
tion in wetlands; draining activities that may degrade existing
wetland acreage or function; the filling of dumping into wetlands;
permanent flooding or impounding of wetlands; and any altera-
tion or degradation of existing wetland acreage or functions. 6
Certain activities excluded from the permitting process include:
(1) discharges of dredged or fill material that have been author-
ized by a regional or nationwide permit obtained from the Corps
for which water quality certification has been granted as of Octo-
ber 1, 2001 (under section 401 of the Clean Water Act); (2) normal
residential gardening, lawn, and landscape maintenance; (3)
normal agricultural and silvicultural work; (4) certain discharges
authorized by a VPDES or Virginia Pollution Abatement ("VPA")
permit; (5) maintenance of currently serviceable structures in-
cluding transportation and utilities structures; and (6) the con-
struction of temporary sedimentation basins on a construction
site. 7
Interestingly, the Virginia General Assembly enacted House
Bill 2292 and Senate Bill 1243, which advances the date on which
the comprehensive nontidal wetlands regulatory program be-
comes effective for linear transportation projects of the VDOT.9'
Originally, these projects were not to be impacted by the new
program until October 1, 2001. The effective date was moved up
to August 1, 2001, when the Governor approved the bill on March
20, 2001.
2. Attempts by EPA and the Corps to Redefine Regulated
Activities-Federal Rule on Dredged Material
On April 16, 2001, EPA announced that it would leave in place
a Clinton Administration rule that revised the definition of
dredged material in order to regulate activity in wetlands.99 This
96. Id. at 1929.
97. Id. at 1929-30.
98. H.B. 2292, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 20, 2001,
ch. 464, 2001 Va. Acts 450) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.5, -44.15,
-44.15:5 (Repl. Vol. 2001)); S.B. 1243, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act
of Mar. 20, 2001, ch. 435, 2001 Va. Acts 418) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§
62.1-44.5, -44.15, -44.15:5 (Repl. Vol. 2001)).
99. Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, Administration Endorses Rule
to Protect America's Wetlands (Apr. 16, 2001), available at http//www.epa.gov/
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rule expands protection for wetlands with no change from the
version originally published on January 17, 2001.00
EPA has indicated that the regulatory definition of "discharge
of dredged material" will close a loophole that has permitted the
destruction of 20,000 acres of wetlands and the channeling of 150
miles of streams in the last two years without environmental re-
view.' Much of the lost 20,000 acres was in North Carolina and
Virginia. 10 2 The new rule will require developers to obtain permits
under the Clean Water Act before carrying out any earth-moving
activities that were previously protected from regulation. °3
The final rule amends section 404 of the Clean Water Act's
regulations defining discharges, which have not regulated the
ditching and draining of wetlands since a federal court threw out
a provision known as the Tulloch Rule.0 4 The Tulloch Rule had
required a Clean Water Act permit for dredging activities through
its regulation of excavation and dredging in wetlands by defining
incidental fallback from dredging operations a discharge into U.S.
waters. '5
The Clinton Administration rule defines the "discharge of
dredged material" as that which results from "the use of mecha-
nized earth-moving equipment to conduct landclearing, ditching,
channelization, in-stream mining or other earth-moving activity
in waters of the United States... unless project-specific evidence
shows that the activity results in only incidental fallback.""0 6 The
rule defines "incidental fallback" as "the redeposit of small vol-
umes of dredged material that is incidental to excavation activ-
owow/wetlands/dredgedmat/pressrel.html.
100. Douglas Jehl, EPA Supports Protections Clinton Issued for Wetlands, N.Y. TINIES,
Apr. 17, 2001, at Al (referencing rule published at 66 Fed. Reg. 4550 (Jan. 17, 2001)). The
Clinton Administration rule modified the definition of "discharge of dredged material"
promulgated to respond to federal litigation over the Tulloch Rule. See 64 Fed. Reg. 25,120
(May 10, 1999); see also Am. Mining Congress v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp.
267 (D.D.C. 1997), affd, Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
101. 66 Fed. Reg. at 4569.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (invalidating the Tulloch Rule and noting that the Corps and EPA were over-
reaching in their regulation of wetlands under the Clean Water Act).
105. 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008 (Aug. 25, 1993).
106. Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of
Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4575 (Jan. 17, 2001).
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ity... when such material falls back to substantially the same
place as the initial removal." °7
A challenge was brought by the National Association of Home-
builders ("NAHB").' NAHB alleged that EPA had defined inci-
dental fallback too narrowly and had tried to assert jurisdiction
over all removal in wetlands, which is contrary to the legislative
intent of the Clean Water Act; the NAHB sued in federal court on
February 6, 2001, to have the rule overturned. 9
III. INTERSTATE ISSUES
As EPA moves to mandate additional controls on daily activi-
ties, states move to protect their interest in implementing such
controls. The tension between state interests and EPA interests
has resulted in interstate commerce issues moving to the fore-
front of environmental regulation. This is most notable in the ar-
eas of wetlands regulation, air emissions, and disposal of waste.
A. Jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act-Migratory Bird Rule
Case
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC") v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers,"0 the United States Su-
preme Court overturned the Corps' migratory bird rule because it
was not fairly supported by the Clean Water Act."' The migra-
tory bird rule was a legal interpretation made in a 1986 Federal
Register notice." 2 In that notice, the Corps stated that EPA has
"clarified" that section 404 of the Clean Water Act reaches waters
that "are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migra-
tory Bird Treaties, or... other migratory birds which cross state
107. Id.
108. See Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 1:01 CV 00-274
(D.D.C. filed Feb. 6, 2001).
109. Id. (seeking to invalidate the Tulloch Rule and noting that the Corps and EPA
were overreaching in their regulation of wetlands under the Clean Water Act).
110. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
111. Id. at 162.
112. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206
(Nov. 13, 1986).
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lines."113 This interpretation of the regulation gave the Corps and
EPA jurisdiction over "other waters," including waters that could
affect interstate or foreign commerce by their use, degradation, or
destruction.14 In reviewing whether the migratory bird rule gave
the Corps jurisdiction over isolated mudflats located on land that
several local Chicago area governments intended to use as the
site of a landfill, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction under
the Clean Water Act could not be exerted over a body of water
solely on the basis that such water was used by migratory
birds."' Instead, the Court concluded that there must be a hydro-
logical and ecological connection to navigable waters of the
United States in order to create a sufficient nexus to establish
federal jurisdiction over a water body."'
Unfortunately, the SWANCC decision does not answer several
important questions: (1)What degree of "nexus" (hydrological or
ecological) to a navigable water is necessary to create jurisdic-
tion?; (2) how far upstream must one go before a trickle of water
is no longer a "tributary" of a downstream navigable water?; (3)
could Congress amend the Clean Water Act so that it applies to
any water used by birds or wildlife without violating the bounda-
ries set by the Commerce Clause?; and (4) to what extent can the
federal agencies use the Endangered Species Act to accomplish
the results achieved by the migratory bird rule?" 7
B. Transport of Air Emissions
In a challenge to EPA's volatile organic compounds ("VOCs")
emission limitations for architectural coatings, including paints,
the D.C. Circuit determined that EPA can establish a national
rule for VOCs because emissions in attainment areas may con-
tribute to air pollution in adjoining nonattainment areas."18
113. Id. at 41,217.
114. 33 C.F.R. §§ 230.3 (s)(3), 328.3(a)(3) (2001).
115. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72.
116. Id. at 176 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. See James N. Christman, Remarks at the Richmond Bar Association Environ-
mental Law Section Spring CLE and Section Annual Meeting (May 10, 2001).
118. Allied Local and Reg'l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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C. Transportation of Waste
1. Federal Litigation Over Virginia's Attempts to Limit the
Importation of Out-of-State Trash
On June 4, 2001, in Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gil-
more,"9 the Fourth Circuit held that four of five statutory provi-
sions enacted by the General Assembly to limit the growth of
large regional landfills and to curtail the influx of municipal solid
waste from New York and other states120 violated constitutional
restrictions on state action.' 2' Three of the four provisions were
held to unlawfully discriminate against interstate commerce,
while the fourth provision was preempted by federal law covering
the same subject.122 The fifth provision, which limited the height
of waste containing shipping containers carried by barges on Vir-
ginia waterways, was not struck down by the Fourth Circuit.
123
On that claim, the Fourth Circuit held that the state presented
enough evidence to justify a trial on whether double stacking
waste containers posed an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce. 12 The court held that although it was not certain
whether the cap on the amount of waste was discriminatory in ef-
fect, there was no dispute that the cap on out of state waste had a
discriminatory purpose.1
21
Having determined that all five provisions were discrimina-
119. 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001).
120. The statutory provisions were: (1) a cap on the amount that any landfill in Vir-
ginia may accept. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001); (2) a requirement that
the Virginia Waste Management Board promulgate regulations governing the loading of
municipal solid waste by barge, ship, or other vessel, as well as the loading or unloading of
such waste. Id. § 10.1-1454.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001); (3) a prohibition against commercial
transport of hazardous or nonhazardous solid waste by ship, barge, or other vessel upon
the navigable waters at the Rappahannock, James, and York Rivers. Id. § 10.1-1454.2
(Cure. Supp. 2001); (4) a prohibition against landfill operators accepting municipal solid
waste from a vehicle with more than three axles, unless the waste transporter provides
certification that the waste is free of substances not authorized for disposal in the Com-
monwealth. Id. § 10.1-1408.1(Q) (Cum. Supp. 2001); and (5) a requirement that the Vir-
ginia Waste Management Board develop regulations governing the commercial transport
of municipal solid waste by vehicles with four or more axles. Id. § 10.1-1454.3(A), (D)
(Cum. Supp. 2001).
121. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, 252 F.3d at 323.
122. Id. at 349.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 344.
125. Id. at 336.
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tory, the court then examined whether the health and safety con-
cerns raised by the Commonwealth were valid reasons for the leg-
islation, and whether less discriminatory alternatives had been
available.'26 Ultimately, the court held that, with respect to three
of the provisions, the Commonwealth failed to show the non-
existence of alternatives that would be less burdensome on inter-
state commerce.'27
2. Transportation of Solid Waste and Regulated Medical Waste
While the Waste Management decision raised questions regard-
ing the Commonwealth's interstate approach to curbing the
importation of waste, the Virginia Waste Management Board
("VWMB") and the General Assembly continue to invent different
ways to attack the perceived problem. For example, on January
15, 2001, the VWMB promulgated regulations for the manage-
ment of medical waste12 that: (1) set forth guidelines for permit-
ting facilities receiving solid waste and regulated medical waste
from ships, barges, or other vessels transporting such wastes
upon the waters of the Commonwealth; (2) govern the commercial
transportation, loading, and off-loading of solid waste and regu-
lated medical waste by ship, barge, or other vessel upon waters of
the Commonwealth; (3) establish a permit-by-rule requirement
for facilities receiving solid waste and regulated medical waste
and prescribed a specific siting design, construction, and opera-
tional standard for receiving facilities; (4) establish a registration
requirement that would include fees for any vessel seeking to
transport such wastes within the waters of the Commonwealth;
and (5) establish specific design, construction, and operational
standards for the vessels and the containers on the vessels. 129
On February 6, 2001, shortly after the promulgation of the fi-
nal regulations, the VWMB suspended the regulatory process to
allow for an additional comment period on the changes made to
the regulations.' It is unlikely that these regulations will be re-
126. Id. at 343-45.
127. Id.
128. Transportation of Solid Medical Wastes on State Waters Regulations, 17 Va. Regs.
Reg. 1297 (Jan. 15, 2001) (to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-170-10).
129. Id.
130. Final Regulations, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2076 (Mar. 12, 2001) (codified at 9 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 20-170-10).
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promulgated in light of the Fourth Circuit's recent decision on in-
terstate trash.
13 1
The General Assembly took aim again this year at out-of-state
transporters of municipal solid waste. Senate Bill 1318 will allow
local governing bodies to adopt ordinances to regulate commercial
motor vehicles used to transport municipal solid waste by prohib-
iting parking at locations other than those specified and by re-
quiring leak-proof construction of their cargo compartments. 132
VWMB would define "municipal solid waste" in the regulation. 133
Penalties may be no more stringent than those allowed for traffic
infractions (fine up to $200).' M
In addition to Senate Bill 1318's grant of authority to localities,
the General Assembly also sought to send a message to Congress.
Senate Joint Resolution 325 sought to memorialize Congress to
enact legislation providing for a reasonable limitation on the
amount of municipal solid waste that a state must accept from
another state. 35 However, it was not passed.
D. Interstate Riparian Rights
An important case regarding Virginia's riparian rights on the
Potomac River was recently decided in a Maryland State Court. 36
The Fairfax County Water Authority ("FCWA"), for some time,
has sought to obtain authorization to construct an off-shore in-
take for the withdrawal of water from the Potomac River to bene-
fit the residents of Northern Virginia. The case was before the
Maryland Department of Environment ("MDE") because the Po-
tomac River is within the boundaries of Maryland. 3 ' MDE sought
judicial review of a decision issued by its final decision maker
that ordered the Maryland Water Management Administration to
131. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4thCir. 2001).
132. S.B. 1318, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 19, 2001,
ch. 356, 2001 Va. Acts 329) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1304.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. S.J. Res. 325, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
136. In re Fairfax County Water Auth. Potomac River Intake, Civ. A. No.
24C00006014, slip op. (Md. Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 2001) (Baltimore City).
137. Id. at 1. Interestingly, Maryland owns the river from shore to shore under a 1632
land grant from King Charles I. Virginia claims that a 1785 Potomac River Compact gives
it and its citizens the right to use water from the Potomac River.
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issue a permit to FCWA for construction of a drinking water in-
take in the middle of the Potomac River.'38 The court determined
that FCWA was not required to prove that there was no practica-
ble alternative to withdrawing water from the Potomac River.'39
It also determined that the final decisionmaker's findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence. 140 The court stated that:
(1) off-shore water is the preferred raw water source; (2) an off-
shore intake would reduce the risk to the public from crypto-
sporidium; and (3) an intake 725 feet from the shore was not
wasteful.' Accordingly, MDE's petition for judicial review of its
own decision was dismissed.'42
An original jurisdiction case filed in 2000 before the United
States Supreme Court regarding an interpretation of several
compacts between Virginia and Maryland over the use of the Po-
tomac is currently pending.
4 1
IV. REGULATING CONSTRUCTION OF NEW POWER GENERATING
FACILITIES
During the 2000-2001 time frame, the Virginia General As-
sembly and the DEQ focused on "pending electrical deregulation."
This focus was influenced by ongoing power shortages in Califor-
nia and the recognition that stringent environmental regulation
has played a significant role in creating that chaotic situation.
A. New Legislation
The General Assembly passed two bills that affect the con-
struction of new electricity generating facilities. Senate Bill 1386
requires the State Air Pollution Control Board ("SAPCB") to re-
vise its banking and trading credits regulations applicable to the
electric power industry.' Those revisions are intended to foster
138. Id.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Id. at 16.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 21.
143. Virginia v. Maryland, 530 U.S. 1201 (2000) (order granting leave to file a bill of
complaint).
144. S.B. 1386, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 24, 2001,
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competition in the industry, encourage construction of new,
cleaner generating facilities, provide new sources with set-asides
of five percent of their emissions for the first five years and two
percent per year thereafter, and provide an initial allocation pe-
riod of five years.'45
Second, Senate Joint Resolution 467 directs the Legislative
Transition Task Force ("LTTF"), established under the Virginia
Electric Utility Restructuring Act, to study procedures applicable
to the construction of new electricity generation facilities in the
Commonwealth.'46 The LTTF is to recommend amendments, as
necessary, to the Commonwealth's administrative and regulatory
procedures that will facilitate the approval of construction per-
mits to ensure a sufficient capacity to generate electricity, which
in turn will provide a competitive market for electricity in the
Commonwealth without lessening necessary environmental con-
siderations, including siting and air quality impacts. 47 The LTTF
must report its findings and recommendations to both the Gover-
nor and the 2002 Session of the General Assembly.'
B. Proposed Statutes
Two bills were proposed in the 2001 General Assembly that
would have impacted electric facilities if enacted. First, proposed
House Bill 2759 would have required the State Corporation
Commission ("SCC") to "consider the impact of nitrogen oxide
emissions, if any, from the proposed [electric] facility.., prior to
approv[ing] construction of the facility."'49 The SCC also would
have had to evaluate the cumulative impact of NO. emissions of
all facilities, proposed and existing, in an air quality control re-
gion.5 ° The proposed bill would have required public disclosure of
any report on the environmental impact of a proposed facility
prior to any public hearing held in the approval process.' 5 ' Also,
ch. 580, 2001 Va. Acts 681) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1322.3 (Cum.
Supp. 2001)).
145. Id.
146. S.J. Res. 467, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. H.B. 2759, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
150. See id.
151. See id.
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the SCC could not approve the construction of any facility that
would result in a violation of NAAQS. 52
The second piece of legislation that failed was proposed Senate
Bill 1030."53 It provided that:
for the purposes of the [SAPCB's] Prevention of Significant Deterio-
ration ("PSD") permit program, and [its] operating permit program
established pursuant to... the federal Clean Air Act, the term "ma-
jor stationary air pollution source" includes any stationary source or
group of stationary sources within a one-mile radius of each other
that (i) generate, transmit, or distribute electric services and (ii) emit
or have the potential to emit fifty tons per year or more of nitrogen
oxides.
154
The bill would have also required that major stationary source
applicants demonstrate that they have "obtained nitrogen oxides
emission reduction credits, allowances or offsets in a ratio of 1.2:1
from a source within the Commonwealth" before being issued a
permit.'55
C. Cooling Water Intake Program
Federal water quality regulations have historically focused on
wastewater discharges. However, under a newly reinvigorated
program, such regulations will also target the intake of raw water
for cooling purposes.
As a result of litigation initiated by a group of environmental
organizations, 56 EPA is developing a series of new rules imple-
menting section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act. Section 316(b) re-
quires that the "location, design, construction, and capacity of
cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology avail-
able for minimizing adverse environmental impact.""7 The major
potential environmental impacts of cooling water intake struc-
tures are impingement and entrainment of aquatic organisms.
EPA proposes to define impingement as "the entrapment of
aquatic organisms on the outer part of an intake structure or
152. See id.
153. S.B. 1030, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Cronin v. Browner, 90 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1994).
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against a screening device during periods of intake water with-
drawal." 5 ' Entrainment would be defined as "the incorporation of
fish, eggs, larvae and other plankton with intake water flow en-
tering and passing through a cooling water intake structure and
into a cooling water system."
159
Many electric utility and manufacturing facilities use cooling
water drawn from surface waters and thus may be subject to new
section 316(b) rules. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York recently approved changes to a
phased rulemaking schedule proposed by the parties after
lengthy negotiations. 60 Phase I of the rules applies to all "new"
facilities-that is, those that commence construction after the ef-
fective date of the rule. EPA proposed the Phase I rule on August
10, 2000.161 The Phase I rule, if promulgated as proposed, would
differ radically from current case-by-case section 316(b) permit-
ting practices. The proposal sets technology requirements based
primarily on the location of the facility in relation to the "littoral
zone" 62 of the potentially affected water body. Unfortunately, the
littoral zone concept may be difficult to apply and will raise as
many questions as it attempts to answer. In waters deemed espe-
cially productive or sensitive (such as estuaries), the proposal re-
quires a level of protection commensurate with the installation of
158. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Regulations Addressing Cool-
ing Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 49,060, 49,116 (Aug. 10,
2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 125.83) [hereinafter Water Intake Rules].
159. Id.
160. Amended Consent Decree, Cronin v. Browner, 90 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(No. 93 CIV 0314) [hereinafter Amended Consent Decree].
161. Water Intake Rules, supra note 158, at 49,060.
162. EPA proposes to define the "littoral zone" as
any nearshore area in a freshwater river or stream, lake or reservoir, or es-
tuary or tidal river extending from the level of highest seasonal water to the
deepest point at which submerged aquatic vegetation can be sustained (i.e.,
the photic zone extending from shore to the substrate receiving one (1) per-
cent of incident light); where there is a significant change in slope that re-
sults in changes to habitat and/or community structure; and where there is a
significant change in the composition of the substrate (e.g., cobble to sand,
sand to mud). In oceans, the littoral zone encompasses the photic zone of the
neritic region. The photic zone is that part of the water that receives suffi-
cient sunlight for plants to be able to photosynthesize. The neritic region is
the shallow water or nearshore zone over the continental shelf.
Id. at 49,083-84.
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wet recirculating cooling towers, which can reduce flow by sev-
enty to ninety-eight percent. 1
63
The comment period on the proposal closed on November 9,
2000, and according to the consent decree, EPA must take "final
action" on the rule by November 9, 2001."6 On May 25, 2001,
EPA issued a Notice of Data Availability for the Phase I rule in
which it both presented and sought new data on a large number
of issues related to the rule.'65 Given this notice and the transi-
tion in federal administrations, it is very difficult to predict how
EPA intends to adjust its proposal before issuing the final regula-
tion.
In Phase II of the rulemaking, EPA will develop section 316(b)
rules for a subset of existing electric utility facilities and non-
utility power producers. 66 According to the consent decree, EPA
will determine an appropriate intake water flow threshold that
will define the scope of the facilities covered under Phase 11.167
The majority of electric utility facilities likely will fall within the
scope of Phase II. EPA must propose the Phase II rule by Febru-
ary 28, 2002, and take "final action" on it by August 28, 2003.68
Phase III of the rule will cover all manufacturing facilities that
withdraw cooling water from surface waters, as well as any util-
ity or non-utility power producers not regulated by the Phase II
rule. 69 EPA has identified certain manufacturing sectors (includ-
ing pulp and paper, iron and steel, chemicals, and petroleum re-
fining) as likely to be affected by the rule. 7 ° These industries
have been adamant that EPA make adequate distinctions be-
tween process water and cooling water.'7 ' EPA plans to propose
163. See id. at 49,087.
164. See Amended Consent Decree, supra note 160, at 5.
165. Notice of Data Availability; Natural Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-
Regulations Addressing Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg.
28,853 (May 25, 2001).
166. See Amended Consent Decree, supra note 160, at 4.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 5-6.
169. Id. at 4-5.
170. See Science Application International Corporation, Preliminary Regulatory
Development: Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, Background Paper 2: Cooling Water
Use for Selected U.S. Industries (Sept. 30, 1994), at 7.
171. American Forest and Paper Association, Comments Regarding Proposed Rule Per-
taining to CWA Section 316(b) Regulation of Cooling Water Intake Structures for the New
Facilities (Nov. 9, 2000), at 23-30.
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the Phase III rule on June 15, 2003, and take "final action" on the
rule by December 15, 2004.172
Until issuance of the final Phase II and Phase III rules, exist-
ing facilities should not be affected by section 316(b) develop-
ments. In December 2000, EPA headquarters issued a guidance
letter reminding states and regions to review permit renewal ap-
plications for section 316(b) implications.7 3 The letter, however,
also stated that the Phase I rule did not apply to existing facili-
ties and should not be used as guidance for establishing sec-
tion 316(b) limitations for existing facilities.7 4
V. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Over the past year, many environmental programs have tar-
geted sustainable development. Sustainable development has
been articulated as the use of resources so as to "meet[ ] the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs."'75 Much of the work in this area is
concerned with stemming the tide of urban sprawl and promoting
urban recycling. Also, there is an evolving recognition that it is
necessary to reexamine "command and control" environmental
regulatory schemes to ensure that their rigidity does not deter
sustainable development.
A. Corps Suspension of ASP-18
In 1987, the Norfolk District of the Corps adopted Abbreviated
Standard Permit 18 ("ASP-18"), which functioned as a stream-
lined individual permit for activities having "minimal environ-
mental consequence."7 6 On January 25, 2001, the Friends of the
Earth and the Forest Conservation Council sued the Corps seek-
172. Amended Consent Decree, supra note 160, at 6.
173. Memorandum regarding the Implementation of Section 316(b) in National Pollut-
ant Discharge Elimination System Permits from Michael B. Cook, Director, Office of
Wastewater Management, Environmental Protection Agency, to Water Division Directors,
Regions I-X, State NPDES Directors 1 (Dec. 28, 2000) (on file with author).
174. Id. at 2.
175. WORLD COM'N ON ENvT. AND DEV., OUR COMMON FuTuRE 43 (1987).
176. See United States Army Corps of Engineers Norfolk District, Department of the
Army Abbreviated Standard Permit (87-ASP-18) (ASP-18 was reissued in 1992 and 1997.).
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ing to invalidate ASP-18 for the Corps' failure to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act.'77 The Corps has voluntarily
suspended use of ASP-18 indefinitely and is considering actions
to replace it.
B. Brownfields Redevelopment
One popular way to encourage sustainable development has
been to create incentives whereby industry confronts urban
sprawl through the redevelopment of formerly used industrial
sites. The revitalization of these former industrial sites, or brown-
fields, is encouraged on the federal, state, and local level.
1. Federal Legislation
On April 25, 2001, the United States Senate passed legislation
that would spur cleanup and redevelopment of contaminated in-
dustrial sites.' The measure would authorize $200 million an-
nually to fund assessment and cleanup activities of brownfields,
an increase from the $90 to $92 million that has been spent an-
nually over the last few years.'79 Of the $200 million, $150 million
would be authorized to fund assessment activities, and $50 mil-
lion would go toward cleanup measures8 0 Also, the legislation
would amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") to protect innocent
landowners and prospective purchasers or developers of brown-
fields from Superfund liability.'
Under the Brownfields Act, EPA could step in during a cleanup
or issue a so-called "reopener" if: (1) a state asks for federal help;
(2) EPA determines that contamination has or might migrate
across state lines; (3) new information is discovered about the
level of contamination at the site; or (4) EPA finds there is an
177. Forest Conservation Council v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No.
1:01CV00162 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 25, 2001).
178. See Brownfields Revisitation and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001, S. 350,
107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Brownfields Act].
179. See id. § 128.
180. See id.
181. Id. CERCLA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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"imminent and substantial endangerment" to human health or
the environment at the site. 
8 2
2. State Studies
The Virginia General Assembly adopted House Joint Resolu-
tion 671, which created the Commission on Growth and Economic
Development."3 The Commission is charged to: (1) examine the
ability of the revenue resources to support Virginia's infrastruc-
ture needs with specific attention toward the revitalization of
older suburbs and inner-city areas; (2) evaluate the Commission
on Virginia's State and Local Tax Structure's plan for the twenty-
first century; (3) improve the vitality of older industrial communi-
ties through the development of abandoned and unused brown-
fields sites; and (4) construct funding vehicles for open space
preservation while considering how individual property rights
may be preserved."'
3. Changes to the Voluntary Remediation Program
DEQ has great discretion over hazardous waste cleanups
through the Voluntary Remediation Plan ('VRP"). s5 The VRP
program allows participants to voluntarily remediate brownfields
property to levels that protect human health and the environ-
ment, while minimizing the expense and delay of the remediation
process. 86 The VWMB has proposed an amendment to the VRP
regulations that will: (1) update the regulations to incorporate
current sampling and analysis methodology and to consider al-
ternative technologies; (2) update the definitions section of the
regulation; (3) review the requirements for termination participa-
tion in the program; (4) delete obsolete language from the regula-
182. Brownfields Act, § 301.
183. H.J. Res. 671, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
184 Id.
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001); see also Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality, Voluntary Remediation Program at http://ww.deq.state.va.usl
wastefvrp.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2001) (providing additional information on the VRP
program).
186. Id.
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tion; and (5) review the various documents incorporated by refer-
ence into the regulation."8 7
4. Local Government Use of the VRP
House Bill 1873 expands the VRP for properties owned by local
governments. 88 The bill: (1) eliminates the requirement that local
governments pay registration fees to voluntarily remediate prop-
erty; (2) creates the Virginia Voluntary Remediation Fund to en-
courage the remediation of brownfields through state grants; and
(3) provides that the Virginia Water Facilities Revolving Fund
will be an available source of funds for local governments in re-
ducing groundwater contamination.'89 The provisions of the bill,
with respect to registration fees and the creation of the Voluntary
Remediation Fund, will not become effective unless funds are ap-
propriated in the 2001, 2002, 2003, or 2004 budgets. 90
C. Encouraging Recycling
Another means of sustainable development is the encourage-
ment of recycling.
1. The Superfund Recycling Equity Act
Some types of recycling, however, had the potential for over-
whelming liability under CERCLA. On November 29, 1999,
President Clinton signed the Superfund Recycling Equity Act
("SREA"). 9' The impetus behind passage of SREA was:
(1) to promote the reuse and recycling of scrap material in further-
ance of the goals of waste minimization and natural resource conser-
vation while protecting human health and the environment; (2) to
create greater equity in the statutory treatment of recycled versus
187. Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 25 (Sept. 25, 2000).
188. H.B. 1873, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 24, 2001,
ch. 587, 2001 Va. Acts 687) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1429.1, 10.1-1429.5 (Cum.
Supp. 2001), 62.1-229.2 (Repl. Vol. 2001)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 9627 (Supp. V 1999).
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virgin materials; and (3) to remove the disincentives and impedi-
ments to recycling created as an unintended consequence of the 1980
Superfimd liability provisions.1
92
SREA provides that persons or entities who "arrange for recy-
cling of recyclable material shall not" be subject to arranger
liability under CERCLA. 193 Under SREA, "recyclable material" in-
cludes "spent lead-acid" batteries and "scrap metal."194 "'[S]crap
metal' means bits and pieces of metal parts... or metal pieces
that may be combined together with bolts or soldering.., which
when worn or superfluous can be recycled, except for scrap metals
that the Administrator excludes from this definition by regula-
tion."195 SREA provides that its protection from CERCLA ar-
ranger liability "shall not affect any concluded judicial or admin-
istrative action or any pending judicial action initiated by the
United States prior to the enactment of' SREA. 96
2. Oil/Radiator Fluid
Similarly, the General Assembly took strides to encourage the
recycling of material routinely disposed. Senate Bill 1003 requires
DEQ to establish a statewide program to manage used motor oil,
oil filters, and antifreeze. 97 Under the program, DEQ must es-
tablish a list of collection sites that accept these used products,
and provide a recycling education program and additional collec-
tion site information on an Internet Web site. 98 The bill further
requires retail sellers of these products who do not accept returns
of the used products to post a sign giving consumers collection
site information. 199 Retailers failing to post this information shall
be subjected to a $25 fine.200 The bill also requires the Division of
192. Pub. L. No. 106-113, div. B § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-598 (1999).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 9627(a) (Supp. V 1999).
194. Id. § 9627(b).
195. Id. § 9627(d)(3).
196. Id. § 9627(i).
197. S.B. 1003, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 24, 2001,
ch. 569, 2001 Va. Acts 668) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-1111 (2001 Repl. Vol.), 10.1-
1400, 10.1-1422.6 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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Purchases and Supply to create procurement preferences for
products containing recycled oil and antifreeze.2 '
D. Encouraging Reuse of Reclaimed Wastewater
On March 26, 2001, the SWCB initiated a rulemaking regard-
ing the reuse of reclaimed wastewater pursuant to legislation en-
acted during the General Assembly's 2000 session.2" 2 This legisla-
tion required the SWCB to "promote and establish requirements
for the reclamation and reuse of wastewater that are protective of
state waters and public health as an alternative to directly dis-
charging pollutants into waters of the state."203 The rulemaking is
expected to address
the following six water reuse categories: (1) land irrigation for agri-
cultural, forest, and landscape use; (2) groundwater recharge for cer-
tain purposes (e.g., saltwater intrusion control); (3) industrial proc-
esses (e.g., cooling, boiler feed, stack scrubbing, and process water);
(4) nonpotable urban (e.g., fire protection, street washing, and vehi-
cle washing); (5) environmental (e.g., stream flow augmenta-
tion/fishery sustainability); and (6) miscellaneous (e.g., snowmaking,
dust control, and construction).20 4
E. Tax and Bankruptcy Implications of Growth/Recycling
The Commonwealth continues, through its agencies, to encour-
age recycling and redevelopment through tax incentives. The
problem exists in the interpretation of many of these tax breaks,
however. During the course of this year there were tax credits
proposed for recycling, but two courts had to weigh-in in the in-
terpretation of value to attribute to contamination and cleanups.
201. Id.
202. See Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2144, 2145 (Mar. 26,
2001) (to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-40-10).
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(15) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
204. Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 17 Va. Regs. Reg., 2144, 2145 (Mar. 26,
2001) (to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-40-10).
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1. Recycling Machinery Tax Credits
On November 20, 2000, the VWMB proposed regulations that
would modify the existing tax exempt regulations for recycling
machinery.0 5 As proposed, the new regulations eliminate the re-
quirement to notify DEQ of the purchase price of machinery, al-
low for mobile machinery to be used for the exemption, and clar-
ify which machinery is not included within the exemption." 6
These regulations have not yet been promulgated.
2. Tax Implications of Cleaning Up Contaminated Sites
Last year, the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion that addressed
whether certain cleanup costs were tax deductible at the federal
level." ' The controversy involved a power plant that was located
on a parcel of land in Richmond, Virginia, referred to as "12th
Street."08 Virginia Power operated the power plant from 1901 un-
til 1973.209 In 1986, Virginia Power, which had been reorganized
into a subsidiary of Dominion Resources, Inc. ("DRI"), transferred
12th Street to Dominion Lands, Inc. ("DLI"), a sister company
that is in the business of real estate development and opera-
tion.210 DLI considered donating the property to charity until con-
tamination was discovered.21' DRI, the parent, determined that
the site must be cleaned up before any development could com-
mence.2 2 DRI subsequently began cleanup activities on the site to
205. Proposed Regulations, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 686 (Nov. 20, 2000) (to be codified at 9
VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-140-60).
206. Id. at 688.
207. See Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2000), affg 48 F.
Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 1999).
208. Id. at 370.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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protect itself from third-party liability. 13 However, the cleanup
was not part of a current plan to rehabilitate the property.214
DRI argued that such cleanup costs should be tax deductible
because the cleanup merely eliminated a hazardous condition, did
not increase the value or extend the life of the shut down power
station, and was not undertaken in conjunction with a plan to de-
velop the property.215 The IRS claimed that the remediation was
performed to adapt the property to an alternative use and must
be capitalized.216 The district court agreed with the IRS, stating
that the expenses were incurred in order to place the property
into the real estate market and not to keep it in its previous oper-
ating condition as a power plant.2 17 Furthermore, the district
court indicated that the relevant IRS rule applied only to ongoing
businesses and not to a taxpayer who was not operating the
power plant.218 Finally, the district court held that the remedia-
tion expenses significantly increased the property value from the
time the property was transferred to DRI to the time the reme-
diation was completed.2 9
The Fourth Circuit stated that it assumed "DLI would be enti-
tled under these circumstances to the same tax treatment as Vir-
ginia Power or DRI, even though the asbestos and other contami-
nants were not placed on the property in the course of DLI's real
estate business."220
3. Bankruptcy Implications of Contaminated Property
Determining the value of contaminated property continues to
be a question facing the courts. A Chapter 7 debtor filed a com-
213. Id. DRI spent $2,242,232 on a cleanup of the property, which involved the removal
of asbestos-containing materials, sludge, and assorted known and unknown contaminants.
Id. DRI maintained that it initiated and completed the cleanup to minimize the hazards
and liabilities to trespassers and third-parties down river, who could become impacted if
the 12th Street site flooded. Id.
214. See Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 527, 549 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(noting testimony of a DLI vice-president to that effect).
215. See Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 370.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See Dominion Res., 48 F. Supp. 2d at 552-53.
219. Id. at 553-54.
220. Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 370 n.5.
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plaint for avoidance of a creditor's judgment lien on her home-
stead property In re Blankenship.2 ' The court entered judgment
in favor of the debtor, and the creditor appealed.222 The district
court held that the $100 value that the bankruptcy court placed
on real property (appraised as having a value of more than
$40,000) was clearly erroneous and required remand for reas-
sessment of lien avoidance claims.22" The decision was based on
evidence that the property might be environmentally contami-
nated and that the cost of sampling the property to determine the
existence and extent of contamination would be in the range of
$35,000.224
F. Chesapeake Bay Watershed
1. Legislation
During the 2001 Session of the General Assembly, multiple
bills and resolutions were proposed regarding the Chesapeake
Bay Watershed. However, no legislation affecting the scope of
current laws which protect the Chesapeake Bay Watershed
emerged from that session.
Despite the absence of changes to current law, several bills and
resolutions adopted during the 2001 Session portend future activ-
ity by the General Assembly, the SWCB, and the Chesapeake Bay
Local Assistance Department. First, House Joint Resolution 622
requires the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission to
report on the implementation of the Chesapeake Bay Preserva-
tion Act.225 The Commission's study must include: (1) an exami-
nation of the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board's methods
and practices in assessing local compliance and in exercising its
enforcement authority; (2) a performance audit of local implemen-
tation and enforcement of ordinances, including an evaluation of
information submitted by the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance
Department; (3) a review of local exceptions and variances for
22L In re Blankenship, 258 B.R. 637, 639 (E.D. Va. 2001).
222. Id. at 640.
223. Id. at 645.
224. Id.
225. H.J. Res. 622, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
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consistency; and (4) an assessment, by both the state and local
municipalities, of the current personal and financial resources
necessary for the implementation and enforcement of the Act. 2
26
The resolution also requires the Chesapeake Bay Local Assis-
tance Department to assess the environmental benefits, including
implementation costs, of extending the Act to include localities
outside "Tidewater Virginia" that are technically within the
Chesapeake Bay Watershed.227 Efforts to directly extend the
scope of the Act, without further study or assessment, failed to
become law.22
Second, House Joint Resolution 765 requires the "Virginia In-
stitute of Marine Science, in consultation with... appropriate
state and federal agencies, local governments, and interested
stakeholders, to prepare a management plan for shallow water
areas in the Chesapeake Bay and the tidal portion of its tributar-
"229ies.
Third, Senate Bill 1087 requires the Secretary of Natural Re-
sources to submit an annual report on the progress made toward
the implementation of the Chesapeake Bay 2000 agreement.230
The report must include a description of the programs developed
by the state and local governments to meet each specific goal as
well as an assessment of projected state funding necessary to
meet those goals.231
Fourth, House Joint Resolution 627 requires the Department of
Conservation and Recreation and the Chesapeake Bay Local As-
sistance Department to work with the Corps, the City of Virginia
Beach, other appropriate federal, regional, and state agencies,
citizen and civic groups, the development and environmental
communities, watermen, and the fisheries industry to immedi-
ately prepare a request for approval of a Lynnhaven River water-
shed study and to coordinate all state agencies necessary for that
effort.232
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See S.B. 821, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
229. H.J. Res. 765, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
230. S.B. 1087, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 15, 2001,
ch. 259, 2001 Va. Acts 212) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-220.1 (Repl. Vol. 2001)).
231. Id.
232. H.J. Res. 627, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
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Although not limited to the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, the
results of the Senate Joint Resolution 438 study2 33 (implementa-
tion of local erosion, sediment control, and stormwater manage-
ment programs) may overlap with the results of the House Joint
Resolution 622234 report on the implementation of the Chesapeake
Bay Preservation Act. Similar to Senate Joint Resolution 438's
direction to the Commission Studying the Future of Virginia's
Environment, House Joint Resolution 622 directs the Joint Legis-
lative Audit and Review Commission to study the implementation
of local erosion, sediment control, and storm water management
programs, while also assessing the costs of extending the Act to
localities outside of "Tidewater Virginia," but still within the
Chesapeake Bay Watershed.235
As discussed above, legislative attempts to expand coverage of
the Chesapeake Preservation Act from Tidewater Virginia to in-
clude all localities within the Chesapeake Bay Watershed (includ-
ing those west of Interstate 95) failed during the 2001 session.236
Other legislative attempts to expand the scope of civil penalties
available under the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act also
failed.237
2. Regulations
On October 9, 2000, the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance De-
partment issued proposed amendments to its Chesapeake Bay
Preservation Area Designation and Management Regulations.23
These proposed amendments were designed to: (1) achieve
greater clarity in all regulatory language; (2) eliminate comflicts
and unnecessary redundancies between the requirements in the
regulations and those in other related state and federal laws and
regulations (e.g., storm water management criteria, erosion and
sediment control criteria, septic system criteria, agricultural cri-
teria, and silvicultural criteria); (3) improve vegetative buffer
233. S.J. Res. 438, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
234. H.J. Res. 622, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
235. See id.
236. See, e.g., S.B. 821, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
237. See, e.g., S.B. 1256, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
238. Proposed Regulations, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 144 (Oct. 9, 2000) (to be codified at 9 VA.
ADIN. CODE).
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area criteria; (4) improve agricultural conservation criteria; (5)
add criteria regarding a board/department process to review local
program implementation for consistency with the regulations;
and (6) accomplish numerous technical amendments necessitated
by changes in terminology and numbering protocols." 9 In re-
sponse to comments received from the public, the Department de-
veloped revised draft regulations on June 18, 2001. This revised
draft includes additional, substantive changes to the existing
regulations. Among these are changes to the redevelopment crite-
ria, the procedures for designating Resource Protection Areas, the
stormwater management criteria, the vegetated buffer area crite-
ria, conditions for allowable buffer modifications and encroach-
ments, criteria for granting exceptions, and the process for en-
forcement on agricultural lands.24 °
G. Construction of Best Management Practices ("BMPs")-
Sedimentation Ponds
On April 18, 2001, DEQ issued guidance on the requirements
for permits relating to the applicability of temperature water
quality standards to storm water BMPs.241' The guidance clarifies
the non-applicability of the temperature water quality standards
(specifically sections 25-260-50, 25-260-60, 25-260-70, and 25-260-
80 of title nine of the Virginia Administration Code) in the ab-
sence of a point source thermal discharge.242 According to the
guidance, in the absence of a point source discharge of thermal
pollution, no temperature limitation should apply to impounded
water.243 The guidance recognizes that temperature increases will
likely result across the impoundment due to conditions such as
increased sunlight input, decreased shading, decreased turbu-
lence, thermal stratification, etc., but considers the increases to
be "natural" and not from the influence of any point source dis-
239. Id. at 174.
240. See General Notice Regarding Proposed Regulatory Action, 17 Va. Regs. Reg.
3475, 3475-76 (July 30, 2001) (to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE).
241. Siting of Storm Water BMPs on Surface Waters and the Application of Tempera-
ture Standard to Impoundments, Guidance No. 01-2012 (Virginia Dep't of Envtl. Quality
Apr. 18, 2001).
242. Id. at 2.
243. Id. at 3.
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charge.2' The guidance provides that "no temperature limitations
that would apply to the impounded water should be placed in a
permit that authorizes or allows the construction of an impound-
ment or pond."245
H. Local Government Control Over Land Use Decisions
Local government restrictions on activities permitted by the
Virginia Department of Health under the state biosolids program
were invalidated by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Blanton v.
Amelia County.246 In that case, farmers who either possessed or
had applied for permits for authorized use of biosolids upon their
respective farmland filed a complaint for declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief against Amelia County, challenging county
ordinances that banned the use of biosolids.247 The court held that
the local ordinances were inconsistent with the statute authoriz-
ing land application of biosolids upon issuance of a permit and
with biosolids use regulations promulgated by State Board of
Health.24 Consequently, the county ordinances were found to be
unenforceable.249 Reiterating the mandate of Virginia Code sec-
tion 1-13.17,250 the court concluded that local ordinances must
conform to, and not be in conflict with, the public policy of the
state as embodied in its statutes.2
Local government authority over land application of biosolids
was partially restored following the Blanton decision by the Gen-
eral Assembly during the 2001 Session. Enacted with the Gover-
nor's recommendations, House Bill 2827 allows localities to adopt
ordinances that provide for the monitoring of the land application
of sewage sludge to ensure compliance with applicable laws and
regulations.252 The State Board of Health is required to adopt
regulations by July 1, 2003, to govern the collection of fees for the
244. Id. at 2.
245. Id. at 3.
246. 261 Va. 55, 540 S.E.2d 869 (2001).
247. Id. at 58, 540 S.E.2d at 871.
248. Id. at 64, 540 S.E.2d at 874.
249. Id.
250. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.17 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
251. Blanton, 261 Va. at 65-66, 540 S.E.2d at 875.
252. H.B. 2827, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Apr. 4, 2001, ch.
831, 2001 Va. Acts 1153) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.19:3 (Repl. Vol. 2001)).
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land application of biosolids 3 The fee cannot exceed the direct
costs to localities of testing and monitoring the application of
sewage sludge. 4 The State Board of Health's regulations must
include procedures for the collection, retention, and disbursement
of fees from a nonreverting fund to localities for monitoring the
sewage sludge. 5
Local government attempts to regulate and restrict the land
application of biosolids continue to surface in the wake of the
Blanton decision and House Bill 2827. At least two of these at-
tempts have been judicially challenged. 6 In the Louisa County
case, the court entered an order enjoining the local government
from enforcing the challenged restrictions on the land application
of biosolids, citing grave and serious questions about the legality
of those restrictions. 7
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTEXT
Much of the evolution of administrative procedure in Virginia
has historically occurred in the environmental context. Some of
the latest developments demonstrate: (1) a move toward dispute
resolution in an administrative law context; (2) a closer inspec-
tion of agency decisions through judicial review; (3) a step up in
agency initiated enforcement; and (4) the prevalent use of time
bars, standing, and choice of remedy in resolving administrative
law cases.
A. Dispute Resolution
Consistent with the nationwide movement toward alternative
ways to resolve disputes, the VWMB, SWCB, and SAPCB have
each promulgated regulations (effective July 1, 2001) to encour-
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Buckingham County, No. 3:01CV00061 (W.D. Va. filed
May 29, 2001); Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Louisa County, No. 3:01CV00060 (W.D. Va. filed
May 29, 2001).
257. Synagro-WWT, No. 3:01CV00060, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10987, at *22, 25 (W.D.
Va. July 18, 2001) (order granting preliminary injunction).
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age the fair, expeditious, voluntary, and consensual resolution of
disputes by providing an alternative to administrative hearings
and litigation.2" The decision to employ dispute resolution is
within the sole discretion of the Board."9 As drafted, the regula-
tions provide that the outcome of any dispute resolution proce-
dure does not bind the Board, but the results may be considered
by the Board in issuing a permit or promulgating a regulation.26 °
B. Judicial Review of Agency Action
There has been judicial review of agency activities on both the
state and federal fronts.26' The federal review of occurred on April
24, 2001, when the Fourth Circuit decided Bragg v. West Virginia
Coal Assn.262 It was believed that this case would ultimately re-
solve whether mountaintop mining of coal could continue in West
Virginia, Virginia, and Kentucky. Mountaintop mining operations
involve exposing seams of coal for extraction by removing the tops
of mountains with explosives.263 The overfill that comes from that
removal is placed in nearby valleys, sometimes filling streams in
the process.2
In October of 1999, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia enjoined the West Virginia
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") from issuing
any further surface mining permits authorizing the disposal of
overfill into streams.265 The court indicated that issuing permits
258. Final Regulations, 17 Va. Regs. Reg. 2342 (Apr. 23, 2001) (effective date July 1,
2001) (to be codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-210-10, 20-15-10, 25-15-10 (2001)).
259. Id. at 2348.
260. Id. at 2342 (regulation summary).
261. The drafters of this article note that the United States Supreme Court has re-
cently entered a decision that may impact the deference that courts afford agency inter-
pretations. See United States v. Mead, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001). Mead applied the standard
set forth by the court last year in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), which
reexamined whether to give agency interpretations of a statute in opinion letters, policy
statements, enforcement guidelines, or agency manuals deference under the Chevron doc-
trine (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
44 (1984)). While the impact of Mead and Christensen are beyond the scope of this article,
the writers note that these decisions may provide fertile ground for those seeking to argue
that agencies' informal guidance documents are not entitled to the force of law.
262. 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001).
263. Id. at 285.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 288.
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violated DEP's non-discretionary duties under the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"). 266
On appeal, the director of the DEP argued that he could not be
sued in his official capacity because he was protected under the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 6' The
plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the Ex parte Young ex-
ception to sovereign immunity applied in this case because Con-
gress authorized citizen suits against "[sItate officials who have
the responsibility to comply with SMCRA and federally-approved
state programs under the Act."
268
The court held that applying that exception to sovereign im-
munity under the SMCRA would frustrate the federal interest in
that statute.269 "[Tihe citizen-suit provision explicitly authorizes a
compliance action 'against... the appropriate State regulatory
authority,' but only 'to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution."'2 ° The court noted that the citi-
zen suit language actually preserves a state's sovereign immu-
nity.2  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit rejected the coal companies'
claim that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
enter a consent decree approving the settlement of several of the
plaintiffs' claims against the DEP.2 2
The Fourth Circuit decision was interpreted by the original dis-
trict court judge to require him to dismiss a case against West
Virginia regarding the bonding provisions of SMCRA even though
the law "has been ignored and violated."273 That judge indicated
that the results of the Fourth Circuit decision would impose "im-
mense state liability."274
Three cases have addressed judicial review of DEQ activities
within the Commonwealth. In the first of these, Residents In-
volved in Saving the Environment, Inc. ("RISE") appealed a trial
266. See Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 663 (S.D. W.Va. 1999).
267. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 287.
268. Id. at 290.
269. Id. at 298.
270. Id. at 298 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2) (1994)).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 298-99.
273. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (S.D. W.Va.
2001).
274. Id.
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court decision upholding the issuance of a landfill permit in King
and Queen County by DEQ.2 5 RISE asserted that the Director of
DEQ had not complied with Virginia Code section 10.1-
1408.1(D).27 6 Specifically, it asserted that there was no evidence
in the record of an explicit determination or finding that the facil-
ity poses no substantial present or potential danger to human
health and the environment.2 7 The trial court and the appellate
court agreed that the director considered a variety of facts in
forming his decision to issue the permit, including the record, the
applicable Act and regulations, the permit application, the record
of the public hearing, the comments made by local government
and the public, and the recommendations of DEQ staff278
Next, in a recent case before the Supreme Court of Virginia,
DEQ's conclusions on solid waste landfill permitting were up-
held . 9 The case was brought by an association of landowners
that sought review of DEQ's issuance of a landfill permit for fail-
ure to obtain a proper local government certification for all par-
cels owned by the landfill operator. 2"0 The trial court upheld
DEQ's decision to grant a landfill permit, while the court of ap-
peals reversed that decision entering final judgment.2  The su-
preme court, in providing a step-by-step guide to reviewing
agency conclusions on landfill permitting, held that the evidence
in the record supported the finding that certain parcels not certi-
fied by local government were not included in the landfill permit,
and thus the permit was valid.28 2
The last review of a DEQ decision occurred in a case involving
an oil company's excavation of soil that was removed and inciner-
ated without prior notice to DEQ." 3 The soil contained minimal
contamination, presented no risk of fire, explosion, or vapor haz-
ard, and was removed as part of site reconstruction rather than
275. Residents Involved in Saving the Env't, Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, No. 3103-
99-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 547, at *2 (Ct. App. July 25, 2000) (unpublished decision).
276. Id.
277. Id. at *4-5.
278. Id. at*5.
279. Aegis Waste Solutions, Inc. v. Concerned Taxpayers of Brunswick County, 261 Va.
395, 544 S.E.2d 660 (2001).
280. Id. at 398, 544 S.E.2d at 661.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 406, 544 S.E.2d at 666.
283. Holtzman Oil Corp. v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 532, 529 S.E.2d 333 (Ct. App.
2000).
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for environmental considerations.284 DEQ concluded that the ex-
cavation and incineration of the soil, done in connection with re-
moval of underground petroleum storage tanks, was not a correc-
tive action necessary to protect human health and the
environment.28 5 Consequently, DEQ determined that the com-
pany was not entitled to reimbursement of its excavation and in-
cineration costs from the Petroleum Storage Tank Fund.286 The
court of appeals held that the actions of DEQ were consistent
with applicable regulations, supported by evidence in record, and
were not arbitrary and capricious.2"7
C. Enforcement
1. Authority to Participate in Federal Environmental Litigation
The 2001 Virginia General Assembly enacted House Bills
2330288 and 2602289 and Senate Bill 1297,290 which provide that, in
addition to the authority of SAPCB, SWCB, VWMB, and the Di-
rector of DEQ, to bring actions in the courts of the Common-
wealth to enforce any law, regulation, case decision, or condition
of a permit or certification, the Attorney General is authorized, on
behalf of such Boards or the Director, to intervene in any action
pending in a federal court to resolve a dispute already being liti-
gated in that court by the United States through the EPA.291
2. Authority to Independently Prosecute Environmental
Violations
In March 2001, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed dual
284. Id. at 538, 529 S.E.2d at 336.
285. Id. at 536, 529 S.E.2d at 335.
286. Id. at 536, 529 S.E.2d at 336.
287. Id. at 545, 529 S.E.2d at 340.
288. H.B. 2330, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 13, 2001,
ch. 174, 2001 Va. Acts 121) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1186-4 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
289. H.B. 2602, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 24, 2001,
ch. 610, 2001 Va. Acts 750) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-4816 to -4828 (Cum. Supp.
2001)).
290. S.B. 1297, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 13, 2001,
ch. 166, 2001 Va. Acts 112) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1186.4 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
291. See Va. H.B. 2330; Va. H.B. 2602; Va. S.B. 1297.
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federal and state enforcement under the Clean Water Act.292 At
issue were alleged NPDES permit violations by Smithfield
Foods.293 EPA had prevailed in its enforcement action against
Smithfield in federal court in 1997.294 Shortly thereafter, Smith-
field filed a plea of res judicata in an independent enforcement
action brought by SWCB in state court. 295 The state trial court
sustained Smithfield's plea in bar, and, on appeal, the Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision.296 According
to the court, the interests of EPA and SWCB in enforcing the
terms of Smithfield's permit were so identical that the legal right
advanced by EPA in the federal action was the same legal right
that the state sought to vindicate.297 The court noted that its con-
clusion was consistent with Harmon Industries, Inc. v.
Browner, 29 a case in which the Eighth Circuit concluded that res
judicata applied to an action filed by EPA to enforce provisions of
another federal environmental statute, RCRA.299 The Smithfield
decision is likely to increase coordination between EPA and the
states in response to Clean Water Act violations.
D. Statute of Limitations
The Clean Air Act does not specify a statute of limitations for
bringing an enforcement action. Therefore, courts look to the gen-
eral federal statute of limitations.0 0 The general limitation for
civil penalties is five years from the date when the claim first ac-
crued."°' For the first time in the Fourth Circuit, a Maryland dis-
trict court recently addressed the application of this limitation
period to the new source review permit context.0 2 The court held
that such permits were construction permits; that any violation
292. State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc, 261 Va. 209, 542 S.E.2d 766
(2001).
293. Id. at 213, 542 S.E.2d at 768.
294. United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd,
191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 813 (2000).
295. State Water Control Bd., 261 Va. at 212, 542 S.E.2d at 767.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 215-16, 542 S.E.2d at 770.
298. 191 F.3d 894 (8thCir. 1999).
299. See State Water Control Bd., 261 Va. at 216-17, 542 S.E.2d at 770.
300. See, e.g., United States v. Westvaco Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 439 (D. Md. 2001).
301. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
302. Westvaco, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 440-41.
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that may have occurred commenced upon construction of the pro-
ject for which a permit was allegedly required; and that such a
violation was not a continuing violation for statute of limitation
purposes. °3 The court held that preconstruction permit violations
occur only at the time of the construction or modification." 4
Therefore, the government's claims were barred because they
commenced more than five years after the construction was com-
pleted.0 5
E. Remedies
The scope and magnitude of criminal penalties under the Clean
Water Act were recently addressed by the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Hong.306 In earlier proceedings, the defendant
was found guilty on thirteen counts of negligently violating pre-
treatment requirements, and as a result, was fined $1.3 million
and sentenced to thirty-six months in prison.307 On an initial ap-
peal, the district court affirmed the conviction and the sentence,
but reduced the fine based on its interpretation of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.08
The Fourth Circuit reached three significant conclusions when
presented with the case on appeal. First, it concluded that the de-
fendant was a "responsible corporate official" under section
309(c)(6) of the Clean Water Act.30 9 Second, it concluded that the
sentence was not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amend-
ment, but rather, was proportionate to the multiple violations
committed by the defendant.310 Third, the fine reduction by the
district court was incorrect, and therefore, the court remanded
the case for reimposition of the initial fine.3"' The district court
believed that the maximum penalty that could be assessed
against the defendant for each count was $25,000, as provided
303. Id. at 443-44.
304. Id. at 444.
305. Id.
306. 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001).
307. Id. at 530.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 532.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 533-34.
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under section 309(c)(1) of the Clean Water Act.312 The govern-
ment, on the other hand, argued that the alternative fine statute,
18 U.S.C. § 3571, permitted the court to assess a maximum pen-
alty of $100,000 per violation.313
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the government. In its words:
"[Section] 3571 provides that the maximum possible fine for a
Class A misdemeanor of the type committed by Hong is $100,000
unless the statute of conviction-here, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)-
specifically precludes application of the alternative fine provision.
Section 1319(c)(1) does not specifically preclude application of §
3571. "314 The decision in Hong underscores the exposure that de-
fendants may face for criminally negligent violations of the Clean
Water Act.
F. Citizen Standing
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently ruled on citizen stand-
ing issues in the case of Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Common-
wealth.315 In that case, appellants appealed SWCB's issuance of a
Virginia Water Protection permit ("VWP permit") for a proposed
water supply reservoir project that also required permits from the
Corps. 16 The state claimed that appellants lacked standing to
mount the appeal because the alleged injury was not fairly trace-
able to the decision of the SWCB, but rather, was the result of in-
dependent action by the Corps. 17 The supreme court disagreed,
ruling that appellants had standing to appeal the permit deci-
sion.318 According to the court, the VWP permit, "while a condi-
tion precedent to issuance of the [Corps] permit, had its own exis-
tence, [was] separate from the Corps permit, and could cause
injury" independent from the Corps permit.1 9 As a result, the
312. Id. at 533.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 533 n.5.
315. 261 Va. 366, 541 S.E.2d 920 (2001).
316. Id. at 375, 541 S.E.2d at 924.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 376, 541 S.E.2d at 925.
319. Id. at 377, 541 S.E.2d at 926.
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court reversed the judgments and remanded the case for trial on
the merits. °
VII. CONCLUSION
The body of environmental law affecting Virginians evolved
rapidly and with significant change in the past year, with no im-
mediate end in sight. Inasmuch as the developments discussed in
this article remain subject to that trend, the authors caution their
readers to stay current. In the prescient words of Norman Wil-
liams, author of the reigning six-volume treatise on American
Land Planning Law,321 "read, digest, and inwardly ponder, but
don't believe a word of it."22
320. Id. at 378, 541 S.E.2d at 926.
321. See NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW
(2000).
322. Norman Williams, Jr., Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, Comments to Ver-
mont Law School Land Use Law Class (Fall 1994).
